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We examine how socio-political conflict in Bolivia has affected its economic performance 
since the 1970s. Such conflict includes strikes, demonstrations, road blockades, and 
conventional rent-seeking. Since conflict has costs, it diverts resources away from production, 
tends to reduce investment and could therefore reduce economic growth. We first review the 
characteristics of conflict in Bolivia using a unique data set. We then provide estimates of the 
direct costs of conflict and examine the relationship with economic performance using 
hypotheses derived from a simple model. In particular, we make a distinction between 
economic growth that is due to external factors – like changes in income due to movements in 
the terms of trade – and economic growth that is due to productive investment. Growth due to 
external factors tends to be positively related to conflict, whereas growth due to productive 
investment should be negatively related to conflict. Finally, we discuss how levels of conflict, 
economic performance, and governance might be related in Bolivia’s recent history.  
JEL Code: D70, H10, O11, O54. 
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grateful to Eduardo Antelo, Viviana Caro, Nathan Fiala, Horst Grebe, Gary Milante, Herbert 
Muller, Suresh Naidu, Oswaldo Nina, Henry Oporto, Guido Riveros, Jim Robinson, and 
Carlos Toranzo. Many existing approaches to understanding economic performance in low-income 
countries have not been very fruitful (see Easterly, 2001, for a critical review of the 
various approaches). With all the technological and organizational advances that have 
occurred over the past half century, let alone those advances that had taken place 
earlier than that, it would be difficult to understand the economic stagnation of 
countries like Bolivia if one were to rely solely on economic factors as explanatory 
variables. 
 
It has therefore become increasingly evident that the incorporation of social and 
political variables, as well as economic ones, is crucial in improving understanding of 
economic performance.
1  Recent research is pointing to the significant role of conflict 
(and the role that governance and institutions may play in reducing conflict) in 
determining economic performance.
2 Bolivia has high levels of particular types of 
conflict that may well be distinct from those in other countries in the Americas. The 
conflicts are among unusually highly developed collective organizations -- organized 
along economic, regional, or ethnic dimensions -- that seek to improve their position 
through lobbying and influence, strikes, protests, and other forms of collective action. 
The state appears to have a limited capacity in containing these conflicts, although 
that capacity has fluctuated over the years. 
 
In this paper we first describe the landscape of social and political conflicts in Bolivia, 
the main participating organizations and actors, and how these have evolved in the 
past few decades.  We introduce a data set on conflicts in Bolivia since 1970 that has 
been constructed by Roberto Laserna, and which we employ in the rest of the paper.  
 
We then examine how appropriative conflict, governance, and economic performance 
interact. In particular, we will argue that conflict in Bolivia affects economic 
performance in a number of distinct ways. 
 
First, the different types of conflict have direct economic costs that take away 
resource from production, consumption, and investment. 
  
                                                 
1 North (1990) has been an early advocate of the centrality of institutions in determining economic 
performance. Olson (2000) has been emphasizing the role of governance and power, whereas Greif 
(2006) provides a historical perspective informed by modern game theory. Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson (2005) have spearheaded the recent push in establishing the centrality of the social and 
political determinants of economic growth.  An early precursor to such approaches who introduced the 
possibility of conflict and appropriation in modeling economic growth but who received almost no 
attention is Haavelmo (1954). 
 
2 In empirical studies, Rodrik (1999) has examined the effect of social conflict and the institutions that 
control conflict on economic performance, Easterly and Levine (1997) have assessed the role of ethnic 
divisions in Africa’s low growth, Alesina et. al. (2003) have extended the analysis (but with ambiguous 
results), whereas Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) have focused on the measurement of the differential 
performance between Basque regions and other regions of Spain.  Hirshleifer (1989, 2001), Grossman 
(1991, 1996), Skaperdas (1992), Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2002) have allowed for the possibility of 
conflict in otherwise regular economic models and shown how resource allocation differs significantly 
from those in which conflict is not possible.  Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007) provide an overview of 
the literature.  Miguel et. al. (2004) shows how exogenous shocks to growth induce conflict, whereas 
Collier et. al. (2003) synthesizes much  research on civil wars and their relationship to economic 
development. Second, conflict changes the incentives that would normally be expected in a 
frictionless world of markets so that production, investment, and innovation are 
distorted in ways that significantly impinge on economic performance.  How conflict 
and growth are related, however, depends on the sources of growth. Conflict and 
growth generated through investment are negatively related because of the 
aforementioned negative incentive effects associated with insecurity.  Growth that is 
generated purely from external sources (for example, from changes in the terms of 
trade, or from official transfers from abroad) are positively correlated with conflict, as 
such external sources of growth tend to intensify rent-seeking and other types of 
appropriative competition. 
 
Third, conflict and the levels of resultant economic activity affect investments in 
"institutions," "governance", or "property rights," which in turn affect future levels of 
conflict and economic performance. 
 
We provide economic explanations, by either outlining or developing models that 
make these different points, and we offer some preliminary evidence in support of 
some of the hypotheses that we develop.  In Section I we present the different 
dimensions of socio-political conflict in Bolivia, introduce the data set on conflict, 
and make some preliminary assessment of the effects of conflict.  In section II we 
develop a simple model that relates the two different types of growth to levels of 
conflict and develop hypotheses that we examine in section III, where we present 
estimates of the direct and some spillover costs of conflict as well.  Section IV 
concludes. 
 
I.  Social and Political Conflict in Bolivia 
 
The types of conflicts that have been taking place in Bolivia are qualitatively different 
from the violent conflicts and civil wars that have taken place in many low-income 
countries since World War II (see Collier et al, 2003), including those in Latin 
American countries like Colombia. In Bolivia, conflict takes the form of protests, 
strikes, boycotts, road-blocks, and other similar "appropriative" activities that are 
undertaken by well-organized groups. The influence of government policies through 
other political channels that may not involve any overtly observable appropriative 
activities also takes place. What is probably unique among other Latin American 
countries (and perhaps most other low-income countries as well) is the very high level 




I.A  On the different dimensions of conflict  
 
    Economic dimensions and cleavages 
 
                                                 
3 This high level of collective organization could be part of the legacy of the active efforts in 
encouraging such organization that lead to the nationalist revolution in the 1950s, which in turn 
promoted grassroots organizations in order to favor participatory populist politics over formal 
democracy. See Lora Guillermo 1967-1980, Dunkerley James 1991, Lavaud Jean Pierre 1998, 
Calderón and Smukler 2000.  Obviously, collective organizations that articulate economic interests are central 
actors in the types of conflicts that exist in Bolivia. They include ordinary workers' 
unions, associations and cooperatives, as well as business groups. 
 
Unions include the Confederación de Trabajadores en Salud (Health worker´s union), 
the Confederación Sindical de Maestros (Teacher´s union), and the Central Obrera 
Boliviana (COB) (see Table X.1 in Robinson, 2005). In addition, self-employed taxi, 
microbus, bus, or truck drivers have their own associations, just as cocaleros and 
miners do. Furthermore, both wage workers (Federación Sindical de Trabajadores 
Mineros) and individual, small entrepreneurs organize in cooperatives (FENCOMIN). 
These unions and associations have instruments of public pressure that could be 
categorized as appropriative and include demonstrations, strikes, work stoppages and 
road blockades. 
 
Business groups include the Confederación de Empresarios Privados de Bolivia 
(CEPB) and its nine departmental Federaciones, the regionally-oriented Cámara de 
Industria, Comercio, Servicios y Turismo de Santa Cruz (CAINCO), and special 
entrepreneurial Cámaras in every department grouping industrial, commerce, 
construction and other sectors (again, see Table X.1, in Robinson, 2005) as well as 
more informal groupings one could find within other organizations, from political 
parties to civic clubs and associations. Such groups have influence through the 
credible threat of stopping to pay taxes (as argued in Robinson, 2005, an instrument 
however which seldom has been used), their connections with politicians, or their 




City or regional associations (Comités Cívicos and Juntas Vecinales) have been 
important independent actors in policy determination. They were usually founded as 
voluntary organizations of the elite to promote modernization in the first half of the 
20
th. Century, but gained momentum during the national revolution of the 1950´s 
when the Santa Cruz committee managed to claim a permanent, proportional share in 
hydrocarbons exploitation: an 11% royalty on the production value of hydrocarbons 
for the region
4.  Public investment decided by regional authorities and funded with 
royalties soared in the region and partially explains the rapid economic growth of 
Santa Cruz, which became somewhat of a model for other regions. 
 
During military governments, civic committees established themselves as 
participatory channels, developing consensus building practices within the regions 
and negotiating public works and, in some cases, policies, with the government
5.   
 
Cochabamba, Tarija, Chuquisaca, Beni, Potosí and other regions or cities like El Alto 
organized civic associations capable of mobilizing their constituents for 
demonstrations, strikes, road blockades as well as for less overt forms of political 
action. Such civic association action has been instrumental in the past two presidents 
of the country losing their office.  
 
                                                 
4 Roca (1980) reads the Bolivian history as produced through regional conflicts and Calderón and 
Laserna (1984) collected analysis of the contemporary role of regional movements.  
5 See Laserna (1986). The discovery of sizable hydrocarbon deposits in Tarija and the existence of a 
relatively more developed market economy in the Eastern part of the country, the so-
called “half-moon” states (Pando, Beni, Santa Cruz, Tarija), has created in the last 
years tensions with the central government in La Paz and other more centralist, state 
dependent regions, regarding the policies of exploitation and use of the benefits of 
these deposits, and the more general institutional structure of the country. Regions 
with more defined identity as such and a stronger civic organization demand more 
decentralization in the form of autonomous states.  
 
The civic groups and associations are playing, and can be expected to continue to 
play, prominent roles in the staking of positions and political maneuvering so as to be 




Another dimension that can be a source of contention is that of ethnicity.  The main 
cleavage that could be identified is that between indigenous communities and what is 
perceived as a Spanish-derived culture.  Organizations like the Confederación 
Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos Tupac Katari (CSUTCB), the 
Confederación de Indígenas del Oriente Boliviano (CIDOB) and the National Council 
for indigenous communities (Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qollasuyo) 
exert political pressures through demonstrations and road blockades, developing an 
ethnic identity against what they call internal colonialism that would have continued 
during the republic and after independence from Spanish colonial rule (1825)
6. 
 
For a long time in Bolivia, the class divisions were almost coincidental with ethnic 
divisions. There was an overlapping whereby the poor were mostly indigenous, the 
upper classes were mostly white and in between, as the real middle class integrated by 
truck drivers and middlemen, were the mestizo or cholo groups. This overlapping was 
reinforced both by discriminatory policies aimed to the economic exploitation of the 
indigenous labor force that were put in motion during colonial times, but also by 
successful movements of cultural resistance that lead to the official recognition of 
specific areas where indigenous groups were capable of preserving their traditional 
institutions, albeit at the cost of isolating them from the process of modernization with 
subsequent disadvantages for the participation of members of the group in the market 
economy and urban life
7.  
 
The coincidence among the two structures of social differentiation started to crumble 
after the Nationalist Revolution of the 1950s. The agrarian and educational reforms 
opened processes of urbanization and social mobility that changed dramatically the 
economic structure, removing partially the economic “explanations” of ethnic 
differentiation and discrimination. When some cholos, quechuas and aymaras became 
wealthy, they realized that exclusion was not only economic but also cultural, while at 
the same time those at the lower levels were able to see that being indigenous should 
not inevitably mean being poor. In both cases, ethnic cleavages became more visible 
and easy to perceive, so that appealing to them made viable the development of 
politics of identity and the emergence of ethnic movements. Paradoxically, when 
                                                 
6 See particularly Calderon and Dandler (1984), Rivera (1984) and Hurtado (1986).  
7 See Albo and Sandoval (1981), Loayza (2004), Laserna (2005). structures of discrimination began to change, ethnicity became a hot political issue 
and a source of major tensions in Bolivia.  
 
Simplistic views on Bolivia, exposed in the political discourse of the emerging groups 
and uncritically accepted in the media, tend to forget the long history of ethnic 
mixture within indigenous groups and between them with Western groups. The 
“mestizaje” was an accepted policy during most of the Colonial period and was 
officially promoted during the national revolution with the support of social 
movements, in an attempt to create a unified, national culture and to expand political 
and economic participation through educational, agrarian and electoral reforms. The 
objective of empowering indigenous groups was so successful that lead some of them 
to a more radical belief: that they do not need to share power, but to control it and 
recover what has been supposedly lost during the past five centuries. The risk of 
ethnic conflict arose basically from this way of understanding the issue, which is not 
general but it is certainly powerful to mobilize feelings of resentments and revenge. 
 
Besides overt political pressures, pre-existing or constructed differences in ethnicity 




Lobbying and rent-seeking in the proverbial smoke-filled room is another form or 
activity that remains covert and almost impossible to measure. What has been 
measured in Bolivia are different types of overt conflictual activities, in the data set 
collected by one of the authors. 
 
I.B  Description and preliminary analysis of Bolivian conflict data 
 
The data on conflict has been systematically collected from the most important 
national newspapers from January 1970 up to the present
9. They allow a 
comprehensive understanding of social conflict in Bolivia, while providing 
quantitative indicators of social disruption, participation, motives and tools used to 
exert pressure on governments and the rest of the population. 
 
Every collective event was recorded in a form where the event is described with a 
phrase, the main and secondary participants are identified as well as the adversary as 
defined by the protest leaders. The duration and results of the event are also recorded, 
as well as other variables such as place, dates, coverage and so on. Since the data 
come from newspapers, not all have the same information so that the information is 
                                                 
8 Gellner (1983) has described nation-building as a process of cultural homogenization that essentially 
plays the role of homogenizing labor for ultimately economic purposes.  In the absence of such 
homogenization, communication and collaboration within the modern workplace becomes difficult 
according to Gellner, and reduces overall economic performance. 
9 There have always been at least three major newspapers, one from each of the main Bolivian cities. In 
La Paz we started with Presencia and moved to La Razon when the first ceased publication. In 
Cochabamba with Los Tiempos and in Santa Cruz with El Deber. The same forms and definitions have 
been used for the whole time to make sure that the data, no matter when is collected, remains 
compatible. Before coding the forms, they are compared and the information completed, making sure 
that each event is registered only once. Not all conflictive events reach the newspapers and we found 
that the highest the frequency, the greater the proportion of small conflicts not registered in the media. 
This means that estimates based on this data base are conservative, but analysis based on long term 
trends are quite accurate.  compared, contrasted and complemented so that the data is polished and refined with 
one data sheet per event. Once the forms have been completed and duplications 
discarded, the information is codified and introduced in the computer. 
 
An event is a social, collective action that disrupts production, trade, transportation or 
the delivery of public services, including the proper functioning of institutions by 
infrastructure takeovers or sit ins.  Therefore, for analytical purposes it must be 
remembered that a social conflict is not only an event such as the one recorded, but 
may be expressed by one event or by a chain of events, involving one or many groups. 
For a deeper understanding of a specific social conflict, the data base is clearly 
insufficient. It is, however, valuable to grasp lasting conjunctures and for quantitative 
analysis.   
 
The data set used in this paper contains information on 11247 events registered 
between January 1970 and September 2006, in 17 variables plus aggregations that can 
be made for analytical purposes. There were 25.5 events registered per month during 
the 441 months covered so far by the data, but the number of events varied 
considerably from none in some very repressive periods to more than 90 during the 
first post authoritarian government. In this paper we will use this data base mostly 
aggregating data per year up to 2005, so that periods will match those used in 
economic statistics.  The following graph, displaying conflictive events per year, 
provides a first glimpse of the past few decades.  
 


















































Source: Social Conflicts Watch Program– CERES (Bolivia) 
 
 
After a period of political instability, in August 1971 a faction of the army took 
control of the government abolishing civil liberties until 1978, when social protests 
and international pressures forced general elections. This period coincided with an 
improvement in the terms of trade that enabled Bolivia to achieve an average rate of 
growth of 5.5%.  
During these years GDP increased and the number of conflicts decreased. Although 
there could be a relationship between growth and the reduction of the number of 
conflicts, the abolition of civil liberties in a non democratic regime is a relevant 
explanatory factor in the low number of conflicts in this period, since political parties 
and unions were banned and thousands of leaders and intellectuals fled to exile. Also 
the acute increase in conflicts at the end of the seventies could be explained by 
political reasons: the struggle for democracy and civil liberties. But also the growth of 
output in the seventies could have engineered a struggle for the distribution of income 
that was masked and presented as a struggle for democracy. 
 
The period between 1978 and 1982 was one of social unrest, frustrated elections and 
coups d’etat, in which nine civilian and military governments alternated in 
government. This period ended with the democratic transition, when a civilian 
coalition of leftist inspiration took office. The return to democracy unleashed social 
claims, which the government was unable to control. The deterioration of the world 
economy, natural disasters that affected agricultural production and high levels of 
social conflict generated a hyperinflation that forced the government to shorten its 
period, calling for early elections in 1985. The average rate of growth between 1978 
and 1985 was minus 1.1%.  
 
In these years of social instability and short term governments, declining output 
accompanied increasing social conflict. The inverse relationship between conflict and 
growth could be understood differently, depending on the direction of causality. The 
fall in output could induce increasing social conflicts. But there also could be the 
possibility that the pattern of more conflict and less output was the outcome of the 
previous period: the increase of output generated a distributive fight, which damaged 
growth. The economic crisis that emerged reduced output, and ended the distributive 
conflict: growth may contain the seeds of its own destruction. If this is the case, this 
has strong implications for growth in Bolivia: growth could only be sustainable if it 
spreads its benefits to the whole society. 
 
In 1985 a new government took office and implemented its “New Economic Policy”, 
liberalizing most of the productive and service activities, and pushing for an open 
market economy. This period of democracy and market oriented economy, ended in 
2003, when the president was forced to leave the country in the middle of a violent 
turmoil. In this period the average rate of growth for the Bolivian economy was of 
3.5% and, until 1997, the levels of conflict declined. To what extent growth could 
explain the reduction of conflicts between 1986 and 1997 or the reduction of conflicts 
could explain growth?  The relationship reversed from then on with increasing 
conflict and social instability, as well as declining growth
10.  
 
Going back to the data shown in figure 1, there are two periods with low conflict and 
high peaks in 1970, 1985 and 2004, being the second low-conflict period longer than 
the first. A major difference between those two periods lies in the political regimes 
ruling those periods. While the first was mostly run by the military (1970 to 1982, 
with disruptions and several coups d´Etat), the second was fully democratic, with free 
elections to renew governments and parliament operating uninterruptedly.   
                                                 
10 For a review of the whole period see Laserna (2004).   
The least intense year was 1981, soon after the military interrupted a democratic 
opening and imposed a violent authoritarian regime, closely tied with drug 
trafficking
11. And the highest peak corresponds to 1984, when there was an escalation 
of conflicts and mobilizations that, at the end, shortened the Siles Zuazo government 
by one year.  
 
After general elections, Congress appointed Paz Estenssoro as President in 1985, 
starting a process of structural adjustment and institutional reforms that introduced 
profound changes in the country during the immediate terms of Jaime Paz and 
Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada. In a way, this process was interrupted when Gen. 
Banzer, the military ruler of the 1970´s, was elected in 1997. As can be seen in the 
graph, the number of conflictive events immediately skyrocketed in a trend that 
continues well into the 2006, hampering governance and weakening democratic 
institutions. At the end of 2003 President Sanchez de Lozada, elected for his second 
term in 2002, was forced to quit, and the same happened to his successor, the former 
Vice President Carlos Mesa, by the middle of 2005. The number of events declined a 
little during the short administration of Eduardo Rodriguez, the Justice who was 
appointed by Congress in June 2005 to preside over anticipated elections which took 
place in December. Evo Morales, a peasant leader from the coca region of Chapare 
won by a landslide, promising to give the State control over natural resources and to 
“reverse internal colonialism”. His administration began in January 2006 and 
therefore it is left out of the scope of this paper. 
 
Based on what is shown in the graph and what is known of the political process, it 
seems clear that when the military ruled, the number of conflicts signaled how open 
or closed was the regime to political participation, channeled mostly by overt social 
actions. When there was civilian rule, the number of conflicts signals the weakening 
of institutional governance, implying a declining capability of representative bodies to 
manage social and political conflicts. In both cases, the growing number of conflicts 
can be considered an indicator of a reduced capability of the Executive branch to 
implement public policies.  
 
The more active groups are from the middle classes. As can be seen in the following 
table, protagonists of the largest percentage of events were public employees followed 
by students, urban teachers and university employees.  
 
                                                 
11 Gen. Luis García Meza was condemned to 30 years in prison, and Cnl. Luis Arce Gómez, his Interior 
Minister, was sentenced to jail in the United States for drug trafficking. Both are in jail.   Table 1. Leading Groups in social conflicts 1970-2005  
 
Source: Social Conflicts Watch Program– CERES (Bolivia) 
   Frequency  Percent 
  No information  20 .2
  Mining workers  532 4.9
  Manufacturing workers  421 3.9
  Construction workers  135 1.2
  Other manual workers   223 2.0
  Traditional peasants  543 5.0
  Cocalero peasants   210 1.9
  Urban neighbors  513 4.7
  Housewives   69 .6
  Handicrafters – self employed manual 
workers  36 .3
  Rural teachers  195 1.8
  Urban teachers   612 5.6
  Banking employees  260 2.4
  Students  1039 9.5
  Professionals  196 1.8
  Public employees  1651 15.1
  University employees and teachers  444 4.1
  Private entrepreneurs  288 2.6
  Petty traders   222 2.0
  Transportation drivers  315 2.9
  Political militants   179 1.6
  Citizens in general  825 7.6
  Unemployed – fired workers  282 2.6
  Veterans – retired workers  176 1.6
  Other groups  744 6.8
  COB  320 2.9
  COD  322 3.0
  Indigenous – native   60 .6
  Cívic organizations  68 .6
  Total  10900 100.0
 
Aggregating those figures in fewer categories, the following chart shows 
















Source: Social Conflicts Watch Program– CERES (Bolivia) 
 
However, it is interesting to notice a major change during the last years (see figure 3). 
When we differentiate the leading groups of conflictive events in just two categories, 
formal and informal, based on the type of institutional linkage they have, we can see 
that informal workers, both rural and urban, gained in importance since 1998, being 































Source: Social Conflicts Watch Program– CERES (Bolivia) 
 
The same trend is observable for groups that cannot be defined in those terms, either 
because they include both or because their main identity prevents classifying them in 
terms of formality. What is clear is the declining relevance of social actors linked to 
the formal economy and the institutional system, which is also signaled by the 
reduced importance of traditionally powerful organizations, such as the Central 
Obrera Boliviana and the Federación de Mineros. In fact, the latter being the 
backbone of the labor movement in Bolivia, it had the power to impose policies and 
ministers to friendly governments, and often also to prevent coups or topple 
governments they deemed adversarial. The political system between 1932 and 1985 
was dominated by the interplay between the Army and the labor unions. It all started 
in the Chaco war and remained until the economic and political crisis of the 1980´s, 




In that sense, the current wave of conflicts is very new. Not only because the nature of 
the main actors (informal workers, citizens, rural peasants) but also because the arena 
where it is taking place is quite different.  
 
Democracy is no longer a novelty, as it was for most of the people in 1982, but a 
regularity. State owned companies were privatized and the fiscal budget was 
expanded, mostly dedicated to social expenditures. A big part of it was also 
decentralized in more than 300 municipalities and 9 state governments (Prefecturas). 
The tin crash of 1985 determined the closure of big State owned mines and an 
aggressive plan attracted foreign investments to the hydrocarbons sector, placing 
Bolivia at the core of the energy market in South America and completely changing 
the structure of international trade. In the meantime, a market-led economy continue 
its development in the Eastern part of the country, with a dynamic agriculture 
                                                 
12 See Malloy (1989), Klein (1968), Zavaleta (1970). producing industrial inputs like soy beans, cotton and sugar cane, and the agricultural 
frontier for the peasantry expanded towards the lowlands, supported by the insatiable 




Therefore, the conflict peaks detected in the plotted series took place in very different 
scenarios and the shown trends also express those changes.  In the following graph, 
for instance, even though urban conflicts are still dominant, the rural dwellers are 
leading a growing proportion of events, which demonstrates greater and stronger 
organizations, in spite of the declining demographic relevance of rural areas.  
 
In the same figure 4 it is also possible to see that the number of events covering a 
whole department or the whole country have also declined, making visible the process 
of fragmentation in the social action scene. Conflictive events tend to be smaller, 
more particularistic and harder to reach political aggregation, contrary to the case in 
the 1970´s and 1980´s.  
 































Source: Social Conflicts Watch Program– CERES (Bolivia) 
 
But smaller and particularistic events, lead by fragmented groups, do not mean that 
they are less disruptive. It may be the opposite.  
                                                 
13 Coca leaves production in Bolivia is part of a diversified, domestic economy of small peasants. They 
are, of course, trying to take advantage of high prices but also are stimulated by the seemingly endless 
market and the agricultural features of coca cultivation (a permanent plant that allows for three to four 
crops a year and is resistant to plagues and soil depletion).  However, it is very unusual to find peasants 
dedicated only to coca cultivation, since most emphasize risk reduction more than economic profit. 
Alternative development projects made the coca areas the most attractive due to the concentration of 














Main form of action
 
Source: Social Conflicts Watch Program– CERES (Bolivia) 
 
As the previous chart describes, there is a wide variety of pressure tools used in 
conflictive events. The more frequent are labor strikes, public demonstrations and 
hunger strikes, but the number of blockades and takeovers is also very high.  
 
When we aggregate the events in wider categories, an interesting picture of the trends 
emerges.  
 
In fact, events may be differentiated according to the required behavior of the 
participants. We call “active”  those types of actions that demand from the 
participants to do something different from their normal, regular daily life activities. 
And we call “passive” those events in which the participants are required to stop 
doing something that is usual and common for them. A road blockade and a 
demonstration are “active” events, while a labor strike or a civic stoppage are 
“passive” events. Of course, during a civic stoppage there may be a blockade, as 
during labor strikes there may also be demonstrations. In our database they are 
registered as secondary manifestations, leaving the dominant one as the main 
characteristic of the event. 
  
The following figure 6 plots the whole series aggregating events in just two 































Source: Social Conflicts Watch Program– CERES (Bolivia) 
 
It is easy to see a major change in the declining relevance of passive events and the 
growing importance of active events. In absolute terms, there are more active events 
now than there were passive when these were dominant. 
  
This means that social conflicts may now be more disruptive because they are not 
confined to the labor place but take the streets and affect the lives of many more 
people that are unrelated to the matter of conflict. Because of that, the risk of violence 
is greater in active events. Some of them are, in fact, violent, since they impose a 
disruptive situation on the rest of the population. Road blockades, for instance, can be 
described as a type of hostage taking since the actors are putting pressure on innocent 
civilians to obtain something from the adversary, whether it is the government or a 
private company. Active events usually try to hit or to involve a third party in a 
conflict between two, which implies some level of violence over third parties. Not 
surprisingly, there are often clashes between the acting group and the general 
population. Clashes may end up with people injured or even dead. These risks are 
even greater when governments refuse to intervene or to regain control of the public 
spaces used in active events
14. 
 
I.C. On the Politics of social conflict 
  
                                                 
14 During the last years, the Banzer (1997-2001), Mesa (2003-2005) and Morales (2006) governments 
made explicit vows not to use repression in social conflicts, in an attempt to gain or to preserve 
popularity while making concessions to appease the conflictive groups. As we will see, this policy 
backfired, encouraging more and more conflicts since the costs or risks of being part of them declined. 
Before Banzer quitting due to a fatal ailment, there were already voices asking for his resignation, and 
Mesa was actually forced to resign in the middle of a social upheaval. Morales´ popularity, immense at 
the beginning, has been declining as social conflicts arise, but his fate may certainly be different.  
Sanchez de Lozada´s second term (2002-2003) was interrupted by social conflicts even though he tried 
to keep control by using the Police and the Army, when fragmentation and internal conflicts had been 
already eroding those institutions just as the rest of the government institutions.  Which are, according to our database, the motivations and immediate causes for social 
conflict in Bolivia?  There are two variables that should provide a clue: the explicit 
goals of the leading groups, provided that their official discourse is to be trusted, and 
the adversary towards whom they address their actions and pressures. Table 2 shows 
the first. 
 
Table 2: Main objectives 
 
 Issues   Frequency  Percent 
  No  information  29 .3
   Civil rights and freedom  393 3.6
   Human rights – legal justice  302 2.8
   Rule of specific laws  577 5.3
   Demanding or rejecting nominations 
and appointment of authorities  715 6.6
   Participation in management  124 1.1
   Expropiation of properties  360 3.3
   To change laws and norms   1067 9.8
   In support of the Govt.  76 .7
   Rejecting Govt. auth. Or its policies  1052 9.7
   Public works for the area  739 6.8
   Consumption conditions  380 3.5
   Labor conditions   395 3.6
   Wage increases  1224 11.2
   Wage payments  1258 11.5
   Labor stability  500 4.6
   Organizational – factional conflicts  253 2.3
   Solidarity with third parties  402 3.7
   Demanding support to a specific 
company or institution  642 5.9
   Other  412 3.8
   Total  10900 100.0
Source: Social Conflicts Watch Program– CERES (Bolivia) 
 
 
Looking at the main explicit goals, as described in the table, the largest proportion of 
events were related to wages (22.7%), followed by more specific demands to 
participate in nominations or in support of the institution or company. A big 
proportion of conflicts, almost 20%, were related to public policies or governmental 
decisions considered to be harmful for the leading group, although often its discourse 
refers also to “the nation” or “the people”.  
 
Crossing this variable with the one that identifies the adversary as defined by the 
leading group, it is clearly observable a dominance of corporatist goals (see crosstab 
in the annex). Thus, the fusion of social actors, political parties and the State is 
verified by the data, which according to Touraine would be a basic characteristic of 
corporatist populism
15.   
 
                                                 
15 See Touraine (1987), pp. 12 - ss. A summary of the adversary towards whom a social pressure is addressed shows that 
the State is the main subject of conflict.  When combining with other public 
institutions, like municipalities or public companies, almost 90% of events were 
directly related to the State. Of course, most were not “against” but “towards” the 
State, claiming participation or, perhaps more clearly, integration into the political 
process. 
  














                                                
 
Source: Social Conflicts Watch Program– CERES (Bolivia) 
 
To a large extent, the relevance of the State as the core of social conflicts in Bolivia 
suggests, as we have alluded to already, a deeper explanation of the causes of social 
conflict: rent seeking or, more generally, appropriation of resources.  
 
A combination of historical, political and sociological analysis showed that the role of 
the State in Bolivia has been crucial to have access to wealth, mostly natural 
resources
16. Their abundance, from the Potosi silver mountain to the current gas 
reserves, was only available through political favors which, in a very unequal society, 
were instrumental in reproducing inequalities. Only the powerful could get political 
favors, particularly when institutions were weak and vulnerable. Therefore, no matter 
what the discourse was or still is, most social conflicts in Bolivia are disguised as 
political when in fact are just seeking to influence the distribution of existing 
 
16 See Laserna, Gordillo and Komadina (2006). wealth
17. From influential lobbies to hunger strikes of policemen’s wives, from 
peasants blockading roads to urban dwellers’ demonstrations, from university students 
to civic committees requesting support for higher education or a development project, 
all have a common aspiration: to get a bigger share of a public budget that contains a 
big part of the contestable income. The Bolivian fiscal budget is supported by natural 
rents (or by international cooperation), and taxes, that would make easier to perceive 




A government, when confronted by social pressures, has basically three options: to 
avoid conflict by giving concessions, to repress conflict by the use of legitimate force, 
or to use all available resources to manage conflicts. Of course, it may combine them 
in different ways. 
 
A careful analysis of the data shows that the only period when conflicts were mostly 
managed within the institutional boundaries of government was between 1985 and 
1997. Processes of conflict avoidance prevailed in periods that lasted only as long as 
economic resources were available for the government to make concessions. Political 
resources have also restrictions, but often the removal of a cabinet or a president 
provides a new opportunity to define conflict management options. Repression has 
also been an option to tame conflicts in several occasions, but the use of force 
inevitably weakens the political legitimacy of governments when they are not utilized 
to create opportunities to experiment with other options. Something like this seems to 
have happened only once, in 1985, when a democratically elected government 
repressed social movements but immediately opened institutional channels for 
political conciliation. In other periods, repression lead to political weakening of 
governments, reaching political limits that determined sudden changes in government 
personnel, through military coups d’etat. It may be argued that those changes (cabinet 
crises and even Presidents being forced to quit) helped to avoid violence and therefore 
prevented a deeper and more dangerous weakening of the State as an institutional and 
normative framework for social, political and economic life.  
 
The three different models of political management of social conflicts during the 
period, described above, can be seen in the next figure. Indicators on how conflicts 
were managed are the political regime (authoritarian or democratic) and the 
information on how many conflicts achieved what they demanded, which may be 
understood as the probability of success for social conflicts (see Figure 8, where the 
Pr(suc) variable represents the fraction of conflicts that are judged to have succeeded 
in their organizers’ objectives).  
 
The first model spans the period from 1970 to 1982, when low levels of conflict were 
attained by political repression but where the need for political legitimacy of the 
authoritarian rulers, since the period was dominated by the military, moved them to 
combine repression with concessions, raising the probability of success for social 
                                                 
17 From this perspective it is not surprising to find a very high correlation between the number of 
conflicts and the publicly known natural gas reserves, which are indicators of rent expectations.  Op. 
cit. pp.  
18 In fact, 0.3% of the tax payers provide with 56.2% of all collected taxes, and 77.2% pay 0.1% of all 
taxes. Moreover, there are only 508 thousand tax payers for an economically active population of 
around 4.5 million people. Data collected by CAINCO (2004). conflicts. The second model corresponds to the short period between 1982 and 1985 
that may be recognized also after 1997 up to the present. It is a model of high levels 
of conflict that are in a way stimulated by an increasing probability of success since 
governments attempt to avoid conflict by making concessions. And the third model is 
the one located between 1985 and 1997 signaled by a declining number of conflicts 
and a declining probability of success during a democratic regime, which suggests 












































II. Thinking about conflict as an economic activity and its effects on income and 
growth 
 
Protests, strikes, lobbying or demonstrations take time, effort, and money that become 
unavailable for useful production or consumption. Therefore, they may be regarded as 
appropriative activities – a term we will be using for much of the remainder of this 
paper.  Note also that these activities are not combined cooperatively, as ordinary 
inputs in production are combined. Instead, they are combined adversarially: If one 
side expends more resources on influencing government policy, it increases the 
chance that a favorable policy to its side will be adopted and reduces the chance that 
their adversary will prevail. The more time a union spends organizing and mobilizing 
its members, advertising its position to the wider public, and building coalitions with 
other groups, the greater is its chance that it will win a strike and the lower is the 
chance of its employer. Whereas no strike needs to take place and bargains can be 
struck that would avoid such eventuality, nevertheless the union and the employers engage in appropriative activities so as to enhance their respective bargaining 
positions. In a world with perfect commitment, such activities would not be needed.  
 
That is, appropriation takes away resources that could be used for useful production 
and thus tends to reduce production of all sides but not necessarily reported incomes 
since appropriation conflicts take place wherever there are “appropriable resources”, 
that is, resources that are disputable or available for contestation. That happens not 
only when there are resources and they are concentrated but when their property 
rights or norms that regulate their use and access are not clear, so that the control or 
ownership of those resources are disputed. Therefore, incentives for appropriative 
conflict more than for investment or innovation are closely related with the level of 
security and, thus, impinge negatively on economic growth.  
 
In this section we first present a simple model of appropriation to illustrate the basic 
ideas regarding the relationship between appropriation and income, and we also 
derive some hypotheses that we subsequently examine empirically.  The model 
combines features from the static rent-seeking and conflict models in Tullock (1980) 
and Hirshleifer (1991) with those of dynamic models like those in Grossman and Kim 
(1996), Lee and Skaperdas (1998), and Gonzalez (2005).  However, as indicated by 
our discussion at the end of the previous section, government policies in Bolivia 
varied over the period we examine in this paper.  That is, the levels of appropriation 
depend on the degree of security and, more generally, the quality of governance.  In 
Appendix B we examine a model in which the level of security and governance are 
endogenous and discuss some implications relevant to Bolivia at the end of this 
section. 
 
II.A  A model of appropriation and its economic effects 
 
For analytical convenience, we consider two organized groups,   and  A B , whereby 
each group has solved the collective action problem within them and behaves as a 
unitary actor.  Income can be derived from two sources: One that is generated 
exogenously to the actions of each group and can be due to exports of natural 
resources or local spending by foreign NGOs, governments or international 
organizations. We denote the total income generated from these exogenous sources by 
  This income is subject to contestation and capture by the two groups.   T.
 
Furthermore, each group generates income   that at least partly depends on the 
actions of each group. We can call these actions investments and denote them by 
i Y
i I , 
with   being an increasing function of  ( ) ii YI i I . Part of this self-generated income is 
immune to contestation by the other side. Let σ  denote the share of   that is secure. 
The remainder of own-generated income, 
i Y
(1− ) i Y σ , is subject to contestation; that is, 
  (1− )( 1 A Y σ +−  ) B Y σ  is in the same pool with T  and is contested by the two groups.  
The contested portion of income is divided between the two groups in proportion to 
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Then, the  net incomes of the two groups are as follows:  
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From the point of view of each group, there are two categories of income  – the 
contested part that is captured through appropriation and the secure uncontested part – 
and two sources of costs, the cost of appropriation and the cost of investing in the 
own, partly secure, income. We should emphasize, though, that from the social point 
of view investment is productive because it creates wealth, whereas as mentioned 
earlier appropriation does not lead to any increase in production as it is a purely 
redistributive activity of existing wealth. 
 
We suppose that investments  i I  are undertaken first so that incomes   are 
determined before levels of appropriation are chosen.
i Ý
20 For given level of  , it can 









B Y σ σ ∗ + −+ −
=  (1) 
 
Appropriation levels are increasing in exogenous income T, in endogenous group 
incomes   and  , and in the degree of insecurity (or, conversely, the lower is the 
degree of security 
A Y B Y
σ , the higher is the level of appropriation).
21  This is because the 
higher the contested income is, the harder the parties involved will work to capture it.  
That is, one simple implication of this analysis is that, keeping the level of security 
constant, conflict and appropriation are positively related to income.  Note that this is 
a statement about the short run. In the long run, higher levels of insecurity and 
conflict can be expected to reduce investment and, therefore, future income.  At the 
same time, if growth were to be generated by increases in foreign aid or natural gas 
exports, the appropriation would increase just as it does in the static one-period case. 
 
                                                 
19 This a function that was first used by Tullock (1980) and many other since then literatures as varied 
as those on rent-seeking, conflict, patent races, law and economics, tournaments, and even in sports 
economics.  For properties of this and other functional forms, see Hirshleifer (1989). 
20Different sequences of moves yield similar results.  We have avoided the introduction of a truly 
dynamic model for simplicity, but the main ideas regarding the effect of appropriation on growth can 
be conveyed with the device of including investments in the static model here. 
21We develop a model in which security itself is endogenous in the Appendix, and examine some of its 
implications in section IV. Subtracting this cost of appropriation, each group’s net income as a function of own 
investment becomes:  
 





TY I Y I




=+ −  
 
 





TY I Y I




=+ −  
 
Supposing that returns to investment are diminishing, each group   will choose its 
investment level, denoted 
i
i I
∗, so that  
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Note that each group’s optimal investment can be shown to be positively related to the 
security level σ. This is intuitively plausible, as the incentives to increase one’s own 
income through investment should depend on how much of this income can be kept 
away from others. Since, by (1), conflict is negatively related to the same security 
level, we can conclude that conflict is negatively related to investment. 
    
Over time, the growth path of Bolivia’s income could be considered to have the two 
types of sources we have examined in this simple model: exogenous sources that may 
be due to terms of trade effects, discovery of new natural resources, or foreign aid 
(represented by T  in our model) and internal sources due to productive investment.  
To the extent that conflict is negatively related to investment, we should also expect 
conflict to be negatively related to investment-generated income growth.  However, 
growth that is exogenously generated can either be not related to conflict (when that 
growth in unanticipated) or positively related to conflict (when that growth is 
anticipated). 
  
Thus, from the simple model of conflict and appropriation (which is also consistent 
with much of the related literature that has examined more elaborate economic 
environments), we have derived the following implications:  
•  Conflict reduces the resources available for consumption and 
production. 
•  Conflict and (contestable) income are positively related  
•  Conflict and investment are negatively related  
•  Conflict and endogenously-generated growth are negatively related  
•  Conflict and exogenously-generated growth are either not related or 
positively related (the latter, when growth is anticipated).  
 
II.B  On the role of governance 
 
In the model we just examined, the role of government, in terms of the variable σ , 
has been considered exogenous.  However, as we have indicated towards the end of 
section I, the policies of Bolivian governments have varied since 1970, and to some 
extent these different policies could be considered as interacting with both the levels 
of economic performance and appropriation.  Even when government has not been a 
direct participant, it should be considered a critical third-party with the potential to greatly influence the outcome of the other disputes in which it had not been directly 
involved. 
 
In Appendix B we examine a model in which governance itself is endogenous, so as 
to provide guidance in thinking about the role of governance and its effect on conflict 
and economic performance.  We show there that governance depends on economic 
variables like the value of contested resources.  It is perhaps too obvious, yet 
important to recognize and emphasize the finding is that lower incomes could easily 
lead to lower expenditures on governance and, therefore, more conflict.  Reductions 
in exogenous sources of income, like export revenue or foreign aid, for example, 
could precipitate a breakdown of either the public sector’s capacity or the political 
process’ ability to contain conflicts.  However, it would be difficult to attribute 
changes in the level of security and governance solely on economic factors.  
Knowledge of the particular historical development of Bolivia should be relevant and 
is likely to be significant.  Another variable that is critical in the model of the 
Appendix is the degree of cooperation between the competing groups regarding how 
much they are willing to tax themselves and how to allocate public expenditures to the 





III. Conflict, Income, and Growth 
  
In this section we examine empirically some of the implications derived above. We 
use the data on conflict described in section I, and macroeconomic data that come 
from official sources (National Statistics Institute).  We first provide rough estimates 
of the direct and spillover costs of conflict and then attempt to disentangle the 
correlations between conflict and the two different types of income growth we have 
laid out in the previous section.  
 
III.A   Economic Costs of Conflict 
 
Different incidents of conflict have involved different numbers of participants and, 
therefore, different direct and indirect economic costs.  In Figure 9 we report 
estimates on the direct costs of conflict (left scale), based on the time cost of the 
participants. [The method used to measure these costs is outlined in Appendix A].  
The average over 35 years was a bit below US $ 60 million per year (in 2004 prices), 
or roughly 1% of GDP.  As it is evident from Figure 9, our estimate of their direct 
costs follows closely the number of incidents of conflict, especially up to the mid-
1980s, which denotes that changes in the characteristics of conflict have also 
economic cost implications. 
 Figure 9: Direct Costs of Conflict 
 
 
In fact, different incidents of conflict can also have widely different spillover costs.  A 
strike in a manufacturing plant can affect the output of other downstream and 
upstream production and a road blockade can bring about wide-ranging disruption in 
the affected city or region, whereas a sit-in or a protest with few participants does not 
have much of an effect on economic activity.  Based on assumptions of different 
“multipliers” regarding the spillover effects of different incidents, we have estimated 
the cost of spillovers and report it in Figure 10. [Again, for the method used, please 
see Appendix A.]   The average yearly cost of spillovers was over US $ 200 million 
per year (in 2004 prices), which represents more that 3% of GDP.  As can be seen in 
figure 8, these costs are much higher for the mid-1980s and the 2002-05 period. 
 
Thus, the estimated direct and spillover costs significantly reduce GDP, with some 
years approaching a loss of as much as a tenth of GDP. 
 







































































III.B   Overall Growth and Conflict 
 
Before trying to empirically distinguish between exogenous and endogenous source of 
growth, which is a rather difficult task, we first examine about any possible 
relationships between overall growth of GDP and conflict. The following figure plots 
GDP growth and conflict, with the correlation between the two variables appearing to 
















































Source: Social Conflicts Watch Program– CERES (Bolivia) and INE. 
 
Econometrically, at first there appears to be a negative a relationship between conflict 
and lagged values of GDP growth in Table 3. (We could not find a relationship 
between contemporaneous values of GDP growth and conflict). Adding a discrete 
variable of the degree of government repression (REP) however, reduces both the 
effect and the statistical significance of the growth variable.
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Growth 
lagged 























      0.71       2.06 
 
                                                 
22 The variable takes the value of 1 when the government has been considered predominantly 
repressive in dealing with conflict, the value of 2 if it has been moderately repressive and the value of 3 
when the government has been judged to be reluctant to use force in dealing with conflict.  For a 
justification of using such a variable, see our discussion in the last part of section I.  We also regressed GDP growth on lagged values of conflict, with the results shown in 
the following table. Note that the addition of the REP variable in the regression 
changes neither the quantitative nor the statistical significance of the conflict variable 
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      0.48        2.15
 
The Granger causality test reported in Table 5 favors the hypothesis that conflict 
Granger-causes GDP growth.  Given our hypotheses about the two opposite expected 
relationships between growth and conflict, it appears that the negative effect from 
conflict to lower (endogenously-generated) growth predominates.
23  Since the overall 
growth rate contains both exogenous and endogenously-generated components, this is 
fairly strong, though indirect, evidence of the negative effect that conflict might have 
on economic growth. 
 
Table 5 
  Null Hypothesis:  Obs  F-Statistic  Probability 
  CONFLICTS does not Granger Cause 
GDPGRO 
33   3.211   0.0555 




III.C   Conflict and Exogenously Generated Income 
 
We now turn to examining the possible effect of exogenous income growth on 
conflict, as hypothesized in section II.  Since Bolivia is a small country, its terms of 
trade can be safely considered exogenous and changes in income that accompany 
changes in the terms of trade can be considered exogenous.  We will examine the 
effect on conflict of two variables that can be considered exogenous: the terms of 
trade themselves and the “trade gain,” a variable that measures changes in income due 
to changes in the terms of trade. 
 
Figure 10 shows that the terms of trade, which generally depend on the price of 
Bolivia’s primary exports, are positively correlated with the level of conflict.  
 
                                                 
23 Strictly speaking, in the model of section II it is insecurity that causes both the levels of appropriative 






































   
 
Source: Social Conflicts Watch Program– CERES (Bolivia) and INE. 
 
The changes in income due to shifts in the terms of trade can be referred to as the 
“trade gain”. The trade gain is calculated as the difference between the current trade 
balance deflated by a price index minus the trade balance calculated at the export and 




Where T is the trade gain, X and M are exports and imports at current prices, Px and 
Pm are the price index for export and imports, respectively, and P is a price index. 
 
The trade gain measures changes of purchasing power of the trade balance that are 
partly due to changes in the terms of trade. It must be remembered that the selection 
of variables refers to the specific Bolivian case, where exports are mainly composed 
of raw materials with little industrial value added, and where minerals and 
hydrocarbons provided relevant export revenues, not only for the country’s economy 
but also, through fiscal rent capture, for public spending.  
 
To calculate the trade gain we need to choose a base year and a price index (deflator). 
We calculated the trade gain with 1990 as base (taking the prices of exports and 
imports that prevailed in 1990 as the reference), and using the Consumer Price Index 
(IPC) as the deflator (measuring the purchasing power in terms of the consumer 
basket).  One can interpret the trade gain as representing the “rents”, if one considers 
that the base year reflects the situation without these “rents”. Figure 11 shows the 
trade gain as percentage of the GDP. (For 1990 the trade gain is zero, because we 
chose this year as the base year). 
























































In Table 6 we regress conflict on our measures of exogenous income.  In all cases, the 
sign is as hypothesized – increases in all our measures of income induce increases in 
conflict.  In the case of no statistical significance – as is the case of the trade gain 






































































III.D   Conflict and Investment 
 
In our discussion and model of the previous section, endogenously-generated growth 
and conflict are mediated through investment.  That is, higher conflict tends to reduce investment which, in turn, tends to reduce that source of growth.  The following graph 
shows the evolution of investment in the economy, measured through the gross fixed 
capital (as percentage of GDP), and social conflict. 
 


































Source: Social Conflicts Watch Program– CERES (Bolivia) and INE 
 
The relationship between investment and conflict appears to be negative for most of 
the period.  We tried several specifications, including lagged values of investment, but 
the hypothesis of no correlation between investment and social conflict could not be 
rejected. The hypothesis of no cointegration could not be rejected either.  It is possible 
that a large part of investment is not productive investment (in, say, plant and 
equipment) but housing and other investment that does not enhance future income, 
and is partly an outcome of increases in exogenously generated income. 
 
The following graph shows the gross fixed capital building for the private and the 
public sector, as percentage of GDP for the period 1970-2002 (the statistical institute 
has not released data for later periods yet).  Private capital building was depressed 
during the eighties, contemporaneous with the hyper-inflation, and expanded after the 
stabilization plan. In the late nineties, the effect of the capitalization program is 
clearly recognizable. The capitalization program, the Bolivian scheme of the Bolivian 
privatization, consisted on handling the control of public enterprises to private 
companies that made the highest investment offer for the company in a public auction. 
The company had to invest resources pledged to the company according to an 
investment plan, in theory doubling its value. In exchange of that the company 
received 51% of the enlarged company, while the rest of the shares went to a trust 
fund that benefited all Bolivians older that 21 years at the moment of the 
capitalization, with a yearly payment once they turned 65. As could be expected, this 
program stimulated private investment. But the process increased private investment 
much more than the investment pledged by the capitalization only. 
 























































Since the bigger companies were acquired by the private sector, public investment 
decreased following the capitalization program. But not only the capitalization 
program increased private investment, it also generated an important reaction in some 
groups of the society. The privatization program was accompanied with significant 
public criticism and demonstrations against the process not just from the left but also 
from the more on the right ADN party. 
 
To assess the relationship between private investment and conflicts we regressed 
private investment on conflicts, but only for the period 1970-1996. We did not 
consider the period 1997-2002 in the regression, because of the capitalization process. 
The results are shown in the following table. 
 
Table 7  
Dependent 
Variable 











Conflict has a clear negative effect on private investment. As we hypothesized, more 
conflict had the effect of depressing private investment in the period studied. 
 
 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
 
Social conflict has been an integral part of political and economic life in Bolivia. In 
certain periods, it became almost habitual, highly frequent and involving a wide 
variety of issues and groups. However, there have also been times of a more stable 
social environment, when the frequency of conflict declined and institutions had been 
working better.  The strength of social organizations, whose tradition goes back to the 
beginning of the 20
th Century and became particularly relevant after the National 
Revolution of the 1950s, partially explain this central feature of Bolivian politics, which is enough to justify our analysis of the likely relationship between conflict and 
economic growth.  
 
The direct and immediate spillover costs of conflict in Bolivia amount to at least 
several percentages of GDP, and in some years they have approached a tenth of GDP.  
Such costs are significant for any country, let alone for a low-income country like 
Bolivia.  The actual impact may even be larger since the information on conflict 
comes from what the written media reports, which is much lower than the real figures.  
Other sources of appropriation and rent-seeking, not approximated by the data 
examined here, are also excluded in our estimates.  Of course, the effects of conflict 
are not confined to just these costs, for conflict can affect the incentives for 
production, investment, and innovation, and, therefore, affect future growth.   
 
In fact, growth seems to reduce conflict when endogenously generated, while it seems 
to cause conflict when exogenously generated. After specifying a simple model that 
generates hypothesis that take into account of these two different types of growth, we 
found evidence consistent with the hypotheses. In particular, variation in incomes due 
to changes in the terms of trade can be considered exogenous and we find that 
increases in such income induce greater conflict.  On the other hand, greater conflict 
tends to reduce private investment, at least some of which could be considered to be a 
main source of future (endogenously-generated) growth.  Finally, the degree of 
government repression tends, not surprisingly, to reduce conflict.
 24  
 
A corollary of our approach is that a reduction in conflict would increase economic 
growth in Bolivia, provided that such a reduction is not diverted to some other 
(perhaps equally) costly appropriative activities.  Taking the fight from the streets to 
the halls of parliament and ministries can be expected to reduce, though not eliminate, 
the costs of appropriation, provided that the distortions introduced through the normal 
political process are not much greater than those that have prevailed for the past four 
decades or so. 
 
Building what has been variously described as “institutions,” “governance”, or 
“property rights” is certainly very important even from a strictly economic point of 
view, but little is known about how it can be done in practice.  However, both history 
and theory suggest that the main contending groups and their elites could in principle 
agree on greater cooperation, regardless of external conditions and economic 
influence, and dramatically improve the ways in which the economic pie is divided 
without dramatically changing the pie itself and the prospects for future growth.  
Again, though, little is known about how such an elite compact could be practically 
achieved. 
 
                                                 
24 Of course, greater repression could well divert appropriation into other, less overt forms (for 
example, the distribution of rents among those who are close to the government).   
Appendix A: Estimation of labor days lost and economic losses due to social 
conflicts.  
 
Labor days.  
 
Based on observation and experience, we assigned an estimate of the mean number of 
participants in the events according to the social group and location registered in the 
data base. For example, for an event lead by traditional peasants in La Paz we 
assigned 10,000 participants, but only 5,000 in Cochabamba and 2,000 if the event 
took place elsewhere. If the event was lead by the cocaleros, we estimated only 2,000 
if the movement took place in La Paz but 5,000 in Cochabamba. For events that took 
place at national level, bigger parameters were assigned.  
Aggregating the data in 27 categories for social groups and 4 categories for location, 
the assigned parameters to estimate the number of individuals participating was: 
  
  La Paz  CBB SC  Rest  Nation 
1  Mining workers  5000 1000 5000  10000
2  Manufacturing workers  5000 4000 1000  10000
3  Construction workers  8000 4000 2000  15000
4  Other workers (SEMAPA, YPFB, FFCC)  4000 2000 500  0
5  Traditional peasants (highlands, valleys, lowlands)  10000 5000 2000  17000
6  Cocalero peasants and colonists   2000 5000 500  7500
7  Urban dwellers and neighborhood committees  10000 7000 4000  21000
8  Housewives (marginal neighborhoods, workers 
wives)  2000 1000 500  3500
9  Handicrafters and other non wage workers  5000 5000 2000  12000
10    Rural teachers  10000 7000 4000  21000
11    Urban teachers   15000 10000 5000  230000
12    Emplolyees of the financial system  2000 1000 500  3500
13    Students (high sc hool-universities)  20000 15000 5000  40000
14    Proffessionals (including LAB pilots)  400 200 100 700
15    Public employees   15000 10000 200  30000
16    University teachers and employees   1000 500 1000 1700
17    Private sector employees   5000 4000 2000  10000
18    Petty traders   10000 6000 5000  18000
19    Truck drivers   10000 10000 500  25000
20    Party militants   4000 2000 20000  6500
21    Citizens in general and civil committees   50000 50000 100  120000
22    Unemployed / jobless / fired workers  1000 500 500  1600
23    Veterans –retired workers  2000 1000   3500
24    Other groups        
25    Bolivian Central Union of Workers COB       50000
26    Central Unions at regional level  20000 20000 20000   
27    Indigenous, “originarios”  10000 5000 2000  17000
  
  
Since august 1985 the data base registers how many days each event lasted so we 
estimated the number of lost days by multipliying the estimated number of 
participants using the parameters of the previous table times the duration. Missing 
data was assigned just one day.  
For the period before 1985, we assigned the average number of days that the events 




From the 2004 Household Survey we obtained the average monthly income obtained 
from labor by occupation and estimated a daily rate in US dollars for each social 
group  category. They ranged from 2.3 dollars per day in the case of small peasants to 
9.6 dollars per day in the case of public servants and private employees.  
Multipliying the lost labor days times the daily income rate, we have the estimated 
economic losses of each event.  
By using means comparisons by year, it was possible to obtain the total number of 
days lost in conflict and an estimation of their economic significance expressed in 
2004 US dollars.  
 
Economic losses should also take into account the spillover effects of social conflicts. 
When a group of mining workers blocks a road, not only their labor days are lost but 
the blockade also has an impact on the productive day of other people. We estimated 
these costs using the following criteria.  
 
For each type of event we assigned a multiplier effect, so that the total cost of an 
event would be the previous estimation multiplied by the multiplier effect. Some 
types of events are much more costly for the society than others, and the 
predominance of certain events over other types may signal levels of disruption that 
are not necessarily reflected in the number of conflicts.   
 
Code  Type of event  Multip. 
Effect 
Criteria 
1  Cívic stoppage  2  What happens in one region partially affects the 
neighboring regions. 
2  Strike for a 
defined period 
2.77 




4 Hunger  strike    2.77 
To stop working affects the company, its providers and its 
suppliers. We assign a multiplier that is the reverse of the 
labor cost of the industry. The labor cost in Bolivia is 
estimated at a similar percentage of the household 
consumption over the total demand (36%), so that the 
multiplier effect is 100/36= 2.77 
5  Urban blockade   12.5  Due to the population density in cities, we estimate that 
every individual participating in an urban blockade affects 
100 more individuals, but not for the same amount of time 
of the blockade, since people have other options to move 
around. So we assigned one hour loss per individual 
suffering a blockade in the city. This is 1/8 of a labor day, 
so that the final effect is 100*1/8=12.5 
6  Rural blockade  10  Rural blockades affect less people but for more time, 
since they do not have much more options to drive around 
and avoid the blockade.   In our case we estimated that for 
every person blocking a road, 20 people are affected for at 
least 4 hours or half a labor day. So the final effect is 20*4/8 = 10 
7 Marchings  and 
walks 
3.12  Marchings and walks on streets and avenues have a 
similar effect as urban blockades but they last less, so we 
estimated its impact to be one fourth of the urban 
blockade: 3.12 (no difference between urban and rural) 
8  Take obres  5.54  Take obres usually involve those participants in the action 
and those individuals affected by the take over of an 
institution or a company. So that we estimate its multiplier 
effect to be twice as the labor strike.  
9  Strike on site  2.77  The impact is similar to that of a strike but, of course, with 
more publicity since workers remain in the building or the 
company’s place. 
10  Emergency  0  It does not affect more people. 
11  Other   4.737  Since these category involves a variety of events, we 
assign to it the average of the rest.  
 
These parameters were used to estimate the spillover effect, by multipliying them to 





Appendix B: Modeling Conflict and Governance as economic 
activities 
 
In this Appendix, we relax the assumption of perfect and costless enforcement of 
property rights in a variation of the model of section II. Though simple, the model 
allows for the endogenous costly determination of governance, conflict, and income, 
all as functions of economic endowments and the valuation of such endowments in 
international markets.  We show that governance depends on economic variables like 
the value of contested resources.  However, governance also can critically depend on 
norms of cooperation as well as on historical contingencies.  Thus, it would be 
difficult to attribute changes in the level of security and governance solely on 
economic factors.  Knowledge of the particular historical development of Bolivia 
should be relevant and is likely to be significant.   
 
We continue to consider two organized groups,   and B, each as a unitary actor. 
Again, income can be derived from two different types of endowments: One that is 
contestable and exogenous and another is endogenously generated. Let each group 
initially posses T units of the contestable endowment and have Y units of the secure 
endowment. Then, in the absence of any conflict or governance costs, the gross value 
of each group’s endowment is:  
A
  R=T+Y  
 
The parts of the government’s budget that consist of transfers to each group and 
which can be fought over in the future can be considered part of this category of 
income. That is, to keep our analysis simple, we include in T all the economic 
resources, including those of the government’s budget, that the two groups can be 
expected to fight over.  
The nature and costliness of fighting over the contestable part of each group’s income 
will be examined in detail next. Broadly, the two groups make the following two sets 
of decisions:  1.  The level of government protection of each group’s contestable income 
is determined by past and current taxation and other decisions.  
2.  Taken the level of protection as given, each group engages in 
appropriative activities that determine each group’s final allocation and 
income.  
That is, we consider a setting in which both governance and conflict are costly 
economic activities. We begin with the analysis of the second stage of appropriation 
and conflict.  
 Conflict 
We model insecurity in a somewhat more sophisticated way than we did in section II.  
Each group could engage in appropriative activities in order to defend its own 
contestable income, T, or to challenge that of its adversary. Let    denote the level of 
appropriation that group   engages in relation to the contestable income of group 
ij a
i j. &  
Note that if  j i =, then this is the level of appropriative activity in defending own 




Appropriative activities determine the probability of winning or, equivalently, the 
share of each contested income
25 in the following fashion:  
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( ii ii ij p aa ,  is the share of its contested income the defending group   keeps and  i
( ij ii ij) p aa ,  is the attacker’s share of the defender’s contested income. Such functions, 
commonly called contest success functions, have been used in many different areas of 
economics, including in rent-seeking, political campaigning, lobbying as well as in  
the economics of conflict. In its defense/offense interpretation, this functional form 
has been used extensively by Herschel Grossman (e.g, Grossman, 2001).  
 
The critical parameter that determines the security of property rights is φ . The closer 
to 1 is φ , the more secure the property rights of the defender are, whereas the closer 
the value of that parameter is to 1/2, the more insecure property rights are with the 
limiting case of  12 φ = /  being one in which there is no advantage to being a defender 
relative to the challenger. For our purposes here, we can broadly think of φ  as being 
determined by the strength of the courts, the state agencies and bureaucracies, and the 
political apparatus of the country as a whole. How easy is it for the holder of the 
(uncertain) property right to argue against the challenger in front of a court, 
bureaucrats, politicians, or the public at large so as to convince such audiences that 
                                                 
25Probabilities of winning and shares are equivalent under risk neutrality and divisibilty of incomes. 
For exposition purposes, we will employ the share interpretation in the remainder of this paper. the defender is right and not the challenger? The closer φ  is to 1, the easier it is for 
the defender and the more difficult it is for the challenger to do so. Also, the more 
professional are the courts and the bureaucracy, and the greater are the checks and 
balances in politics, the closer would φ  be to 1.  
 
Another parameter of interest is m. It can be thought of as a measure of the ease or 
effectiveness of producing appropriative effort.
26 Working directly through the 
political process and the state (the courts, the bureaucracy, or the halls of parliament) 




In this subsection we take φ  as well as   as given. Given the level of security, the 
payoff functions of the two groups are the following: 
m
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where   are the strategies of the two groups, one each for defense 
of own endowment and challenge of the other group’s endowment.  
( AA BA BB AB aaa a a , =, ,
 
Given the sharing functions and the identical endowments that the two groups have, it 
can be shown that the (Nash) equilibrium levels of appropriation are identical for 
defense and challenge and across the two groups:
27  
 
    (1 ) AA BA BB AB aaaa m φφ
∗∗∗∗ ====−
 
Note that the closer φ  is to 1 (that is, the  better governance is), the lower is the level 
of appropriation. ( (1 ) φ φ −  is minimized at 1 reaches its maximum at  1
2 ) . Each group 
keeps a φ  fraction of its own contested endowment and receives a 1 φ −  fraction of its 
adversary’s contested endowment. Given the level of security, the equilibrium payoff 
of each group equals:  
    ( ) (1 ) 2 (1 )
cc
ii VV a p T T R m T φφ φ φ
∗ ≡= + − + − −
  [1 2 (1 ) ] mT R φ φ = −− +  
  where 1 2 (1 ) TR m σ σφ φ =+ ≡ − −  (7) 
 
 
                                                 
26Note that   is the elasticity of the "impact" function  m




∂ = / . Also, Jia (2005) 
provides a stochastic derivation of contest success function, where the output of each side’s effort is 
stochastic, with   being a parameter that reduces the variability of output as a function of effort (with 
higher m  reducing that variability). 
m
27If endowments for the two groups were different, the levels of appropriation would be higher for the 
endowment that is higher but the levels of the defense and challenge would still be identical. As can be expected the lower is the level of protection φ , the lower is the equilibium 
payoff of each group. Note how, with security given, changes in the value of the 
endowment T (for example, by the discovery of new tradeable resources, the 
exhaustion of old ones, or the change in the international price of existing resources) 
lead to monotonic changes in appropriation and in equilibrium payoffs.  In particular, 
for fixed levels of security, a reduction in T  reduced appropriation and increases 
equilibrium payoff. We next examine how security can be determined by current and 
past conditions in stage 1 of the two-stage process we have outlined above.  
Endogenous Governance 
The level of φ   as well as of  ) and, therefore, the fraction  ( m σ  of the contestable 
endowment that each group eventually keeps would in general depend on the societal 
and political norms, but more importantly for the case of modern, anonymous 
property rights on the country’s political development and the fiscal choices and 
organizational decisions that have been made in the past as well as those made in the 
present. Many of these choices can be expected to depend on the country’s 
characteristics and, as a first approximation, its current conditions can be considered 
both similar to those in the past and, to the extent that the conditions might have 
changed, current conditions can be expected to have considerable influence on current 
governance. In particular, the resources available for paying and training judges, civil 
servants, or the police can have an immediate impact on the quality of governance and 
property rights. These resources are largely determined by the taxing ability of the 
state, which could in turn greatly depend on the ability of the two contending groups 
to agree on taxation. Past decisions on taxation also have impact on the quality of 
governance though the educational level of not just government employees but also of 
others in the country (lawyers, politicians, engineers, citizens in general) and through 
other collective-good investments from court buildings to university budgets.  
 
Thus, we consider the level of security to be a function of past and present 
investments on governance so that:  
  ( oAB ggg ) σ σ = ++   
where  denotes the inherited investments in governance and   and   are the 
current contributions to governance by the two groups. We suppose security is strictly 
increasing in its argument ( ) at a decreasing rate (
o g A g B g
0 σ
′ > 0) " σ < .  
 
How the level of governance expenditures – which we suppose to equal total taxes – 
is determined is of course an important issue. Security here is a public good and in the 
provision of public goods through taxation, there are two focal regimes: One in which 
public good provision maximizes total welfare and the other in which its provision is 
non-cooperative and generally inefficient. We shall examine both types of provision 
regimes and discuss their implications and their relation to Bolivia.  
 





AB AB gg VVgg
+ + −− 
  2( ) 2 oAB A ggg TY gg B σ =+ + + − −   
 Under the condition that the optimum is interior, or that the inherited level of 
governance is not too high and there are no liquidity constraints,
28 the welfare-
maximizing level of governance expenditures satisfies the following first-order-
condition:  
  ˆˆ 2( ) 10 o AB gT gg σ
′ + +− =  (A1) 
 
It is clear that total optimal expenditure  ˆˆ A gg B +  can be distributed in many different 
ways between the two groups (and that in itself can be a source of contention that 
makes optimal provision difficult to implement). It is clear that  ˆˆ A gg B +  is positively 
related to the value of the contested resource T  and inversely related to the inherited 
investments in governance     o g .
 
The non-cooperative contributions to governance are determined as the Nash 
equilibirum of the game with the following payoff functions:  
 
  () ( ) AAB o A B A Vgg g g gTYg σ , =+ ++ −  
  () ( ) BAB o A B B Vgg g g gTYg σ , =+ ++ −   
 
It is straightforward to show that the equilibrium is characterized by the same 
condition for both groups (and also results in determining only the total and not the 
particular distribution of expenditures between the two groups):  
 
  () oAB ggg T σ
′∗ ∗ 1 0 + +− =  (A2) 
 
As in the case of optimal expenditures, Nash equilibrium expenditures are positively 
related to T  and inversely related to inherited investments in governance   By 
comparing (A1) to (A2) and given the strict concavity of 
o g .
( ) σ ⋅ , expenditures in 
governance under the Nash equilibrium are lower than optimal expenditures 
(  for, under Nash equilibrium, each group only cares about its own 
welfare and no weight is put on the adversary’s payoff. 





We are particularly interested on the effect of a reduction in the terms of trade (a 
reduction in T) on the levels of security and appropriation. The reason is that volatility 
and significant reductions in the price of Bolivia’s major exports – from silver early in 
its history to tin during the 1980s – could have been important for government 
stability, security of property rights, and the level of socio-political conflict, with all 
affecting directly and indirectly economic performance. That is, the external shock of 
a price reduction in exportable could have had effects on income that go far beyond 
the direct effect of the price reduction itself.  
 
Considering the case of the non-cooperative provision of security, where 
 and noting from (5) that  ( oAB ggg σσ
∗∗ ≡+ +
1
2 (1 ) ii mT T
σ αφφ
∗ ∗ − =− = , the overall 
effect of the value of  the contestable endowment on equilibrium appropriation can be 
shown to be the following:  
                                                 
28In practice, especially for low-income countries like Bolivia, we can expect the liquidity constraints 














The first term is negative since  0 " σ < , whereas the second term is positive.  The first 
term is negative because it reflects the effect on appropriation via governance - a 
reduction in T reduces governance and security and increases appropriation (that is, 
(1 )m φ φ −  increases as a result of a reduction in governance expenditures). The 
second effect is positive because it is the direct effect on appropriation. Overall, the 
effect of the value of T on equilibrium appropriation is ambiguous. If the governance 
effect (first term of (A3)) dominates the total effect is negative; if the direct, value-of-
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∗′ −  is large enough, or, when σ  is sufficiently concave.  
 
Regardless of whether the two groups choose the optimal or non-cooperative levels of 
governance, the qualitative effects on security and appropriation are similar. Of 
course, when the choices are non-cooperative the negative effects of a reduction in T 
are higher on levels of security, on appropriation, and on real income.  
 
However, the level of T might also have an independent effect on the choice of 
governance expenditures themselves. If, for example, the two groups were to 
originally have the norm of choosing the optimal level of governance but suddenly 
face a shortfall in their expected incomes, they might refrain from that optimal level 
of governance expenditures and decide on a lower level or even the non-cooperative 
level of governance expenditures. Such a choice might come about because of internal 
disputes within groups as well as between the groups that are often precipitated by 
reductions in incomes or other crises. Allowing for a continuous effect of T on the 
level of cooperation between the groups regarding governance expenditures, we can 
posit that these expenditures are a convex combination of the optimal and non-
cooperative choices:  
   (A4)  ˆ () ( 1 () ) w h e r e ( ) 0 a n d ii i gT T g i A g
γ γγ γ
∗′ =+ − ⋅ >= B ,
 
Then, the total effect on appropriation of changes in  pT  becomes:  
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where  ˆ ˆˆ () oAB AB AB gggg ggg gg
γγ γ σσ
∗ ∗∗ ≡+ + , ≡ + , ≡ + ,  and  ˆ ˆˆ () o AB g gg σ σ ≡ ++.   
The last two terms of (A5) are qualitatively similar to those of the two terms in (A3). 
The first term in (A5) is new and is due to the change in the level of governance choices induced by a change in T; that effect is negative since   and 
 Recapitulating, a reduction in the value of the contested resource T has three 
effects:  
() 0 0 T
γ γσ






(i) A tendency to reduce appropriation because the value of the contestable resource is 
reduced (represented by third term in (A5);  
 
(ii) A tendency to increase appropriation because it reduces the governance 
expenditures and security (represented by second term in (A5));  
 
(iii) A tendency to increase appropriation because it reduces the degree of cooperation 
on the choice of governance expenditures between the groups (represented by the first 
term in (A5)). 
  
Of course, the opposite effects are present on the real final income of the groups. In 
addition, each group’s income is reduced directly since T is part of income, but which 
is counterbalanced by the reduction in governance expenditures as a result of a 
reduction in T.  Final real income for each group is:  
  
     (( ) ) ( )
r
i Yg T T R g
γ σ =+ −
 
Overall, the effect of the size of contested resources on incomes is ambiguous and 
depends on the degree of cooperation among the groups, which in turn can critically 
depend on historical contingencies.  Economic factors are important but can only be a 
part of the story.  History and elite norms of cooperation can be important as well.  
We provide an overview of these non-economic factors in the Bolivia in section IV. REFERENCES 
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